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Abstract: 
 
A merger of profession and academe in intelligence education, that is professional intelligence 
education conforming to nationally accredited standards for higher education, has for long been 
an ‘unresolved problem’ in the intelligence education domain. This paper discusses the creation 
of a new Bachelor’s degree in Intelligence Studies at the Norwegian Defence Intelligence School 
(NORDIS). This programme is designed to offer professional intelligence officers, from a variety 
of Norwegian organisations, the opportunity to develop their academic knowledge of intelligence 
without interrupting their career progression. It is also designed as a forum for developing a more 
shared sense of community within Norway’s security and intelligence bureaucracy. The paper 
introduces the origins of the School, the philosophy that underpinned the School’s work, and the 
background of the programme. With an emphasis on four core intelligence modules from the 
‘academic’ tradition , it also presents the taught elements of the course, ranging from the modules 
focused on ‘practical elements’, which is described briefly, to the more strictly and traditional 
‘academic’ sections, wherein a discussion of the subject matter taught throughout the programme. 
It concludes with our reflection on the development of the course, and how the vision that 
underpinned it is being realised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It started with an idea, and like all visionary ideas this particular one, unlike those resulting from 
linear and bureaucratic processes, was of course conceived during informal discussions; thoughts 
were shared and tweaked, and then scribbled down on paper napkins and coasters. 
 
The original idea was that intelligence operatives, from different sectors in the intelligence 
community with extensive experience – deep or broad – would not only continue working in the 
Norwegian intelligence profession, but would also have the opportunity to advance in their 
careers.  As Sir David Omand says: “Collection of intelligence is a highly specialised set of public 
service activities that involves maintaining functional organizations able to recruit, train and 
motivate very different and unique kinds of people.”1 However, the individuals were often trained 
on the job and thus often did not have a formal education before entering into the intelligence 
community. During their careers, many of their home units found it hard to let go of them for 
several years in order for them to obtain a formal degree. Moreover, although the types of degrees 
offered at civilian and military institutions would provide them with a degree, the contents of the 
degree would often be part of a completely different academic field, and thus not necessarily 
contain topics and approaches that would fit their specific jobs. As a result, sometimes these 
individuals were passed-by when applying for other positions. Our response was to explore the 
possibility of a customized bachelors degree programme designed specifically to meet the career 
requirements of these valued individuals.  
 
Inherent to the idea was the notion that such a programme would help in moulding a more 
coherent and shared conception of an intelligence profession. The lack of one clear identity as 
an intelligence professional within the intelligence community in Norway could possibly be due 
to the fact that intelligence can be understood differently between the various organisations. 
Additionally, the ‘need to know’ principle can create barriers not only between organisations, but 
also within them. For obvious reasons, very few know what awaits them when they start working 
in the various security and intelligence services, even though the increasingly open nature of these 
services in the past few years makes it less of a mystery than it has been in the past. Recruitments 
are supposed to be diverse, and even though one wants to keep that diversity, it was nevertheless 
regarded as a strength to instill a sense of a common identity: a profession. This idea has many 
facets, but one of which is certainly education. In this custom-made bachelors degree programme 
the professionals were educated in methods and topics specifically designed to meet the 
requirements of the intelligence community.  Some of these requirements were articulated, but 
many were not, resulting in professionals-as-students that would eventually become “reflective 
practitioners”, able to apply a metacognitive perspective on their own practice. 
 
The idea of forming an intelligence profession could arguably be traced back to around 2005 
when NORDIS initially began discussing the possibility of combining profession and academe in 
formally accredited programmes.   In the years to follow, this process also coincided with the 
government evaluations that took place in the aftermath of Anders Breivik’s attack on 22nd of July 
2011, and the many official reports that were written. In the subsequent commissioned report, 
released a year later, a number of critical points were identified: it was pointed out that there was 
a lack of common understanding of threats; and that although individuals from the defence and 
justice sector cooperated sufficiently in order to solve the tasks at hand, the organisations 
themselves sometimes lacked a shared or mutual understanding of their respective functions and 
limitations, and, consequently, formal cooperation across organisations was not as effective 
as everyone would like. However, the report did not call for the organisations to reconstruct 
their structures or roles.
2
 The following year a commission looked at how the police was organised 
and how to improve their working processes, recommended that the police service’s work needed 
to be more intelligence-driven.
3
  This was an acknowledgement, perhaps tacit, of the idea that 
intelligence is a profession, and one can even argue that the idea of forming a structured 
intelligence community had planted its seed.  Even if not directly linked to the conclusions of the 
aforementioned evaluations, the NORDIS-process of establishing a programme that would 
encompass the whole National Intelligence community, nevertheless implicitly responded to the 
conclusions’ indirect call for a unified intelligence community.  This context was the backdrop to 
the new bachelor’s degree in intelligence studies at The Norwegian Defence Intelligence School 
(NORDIS). 
 
In 2013 NORDIS was formally accredited by the national higher education authorities, but the 
NORDIS history originally started out with language courses in 1954. Throughout the years these 
language courses developed into teaching language as an academic discipline while still keeping 
in the curriculum the specific context of the intelligence domain and the corresponding language 
skills required. With the transformation of the language courses into an academic discipline, the 
contents of the courses were evaluated and approved by the University of Oslo as early as 1976.
4
 
As a result, the academic influence from the language teachers, as well as the collaboration 
between the language teachers and the instructors in the intelligence training courses (the latter 
had strategically begun to recruit intelligence officers with formal academic degrees and were also 
in the process of designing a training section and research-informed specialisation course in 
intelligence analysis), was part of inspiration to the NORDIS Commandant at that time: To 
establish nationally accredited programmes, first, a combined course for language development 
and professional intelligence training – now known as the full-time bachelors programme for 
students recruited from outside the intelligence community, specializing in language and 
intelligence studies – second, for the new initiative, the study of intelligence as an academic 
discipline.  
 
With the fusion of professional practice and experience-based knowledge on the one hand, and 
the high standards of academia on the other, NORDIS was transformed into a nationally 
recognised university college, formalized through the accreditation received in April 2013, 
conforming to the articulated requirements of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), as well 
as the standards required by the National Authority for Quality in Higher Education (NOKUT), 
with the overarching aim of bringing the world of academia and the intelligence professionals 
closer together.
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 The focus of the entire school was to create a programme that looked at the 
profession not only from the outside (which is the case for many civilian institutions) but also 
from the inside, which is the case for many professional training institutes, albeit without the 
rigorous academic standards that flows from a national accreditation. This was also essential in 
the creation of this particular programme, which aimed to have one foot in the practical world of 
'know how' experience and the other placed firmly in the theoretical world of academia, where 
one has the chance to take the time to reflect and ask the 'why, how come, what if' types of 
question. With the merging of these views the programme has allowed the students to see where 
their profession has come from, why it has evolved like it has, and to reflect and debate the 
defining questions.  
 
Before NORDIS started filling the degree with content it was crucial to structure it in such a way 
that allowed the target audience to be able to continue working whilst studying. Thus, the 
programme only required that the students be present in the classroom at the NORDIS campus 
in Oslo on two occasions, each for two weeks per year. There were three admittance 
requirements; First of all they had to have a Norwegian Security Clearance. Secondly, the students 
had to have an agreement with a sponsor in their home unit that meant that the sponsor 
guaranteed that they would facilitate the time in order to study and attend classes. Thirdly, the 
students had to already have 60 credits from relevant subjects, in order to show that they had 
academic ability. This also allowed NORDIS to structure a Bachelors programme with 120 
credits over three years, making it bearable for the students who juggled work and school. In 
order to accommodate and be flexible around individual’s deployment missions, and to create 
an environment that would seek operational synergies, the school designed the programme with 
seven modules, four of which were to be standalone modules, not needed to be taken in any 
specific order.  
 
What is fixed is the first module, taking place in the first and sixth semester, labelled ‘The 
Experienced Intelligence Professional’. This is a module where the students are allowed to reflect 
on the more practical parts of their profession. They are given an introduction to a variety of 
subjects: the role of national intelligence in society with an emphasis on the judicial foundation, 
as well as exploring how the service is controlled. They also receive a brief overview of the 
different organisations that comprise the Norwegian intelligence community and explore the 
different roles and restrictions of the various parts of the security and intelligence services. 
Furthermore, significant emphasis is placed on the ethics of intelligence and its function in foreign 
- and security - policy. Throughout the three years the students are given individual assignments 
and the module is capped with an individual exam, where they reflect upon aspects both of law 
and ethics in their professional practice. 
 
As a stand-alone add-on module to the introductory module of intelligence-as-profession, the 
students become familiar with philosophy of science as a foundation for understanding their 
professional practice. In light of, for example, ontology and epistemology, as well as psychological 
phenomena such as cognitive bias, they learn that intelligence can be viewed both as art (that is, 
from an interpretative, or hermeneutical, perspective), as well as a science (that is, from a 
naturalist, or positivistic, perspective). Regarding the underlying philosophy, the crucial 
consideration is that the professional task at hand must decide which of these perspectives (i.e., 
the different ontologies and the different epistemologies) are employed.  It is important not to 
confuse the different types of knowledge that emerges from these different methodological 
approaches with each other or with ‘true reality’. Regarding the concept of psychological bias, 
the students learn about the systematic nature of a bias from a cognitive-behavioral perspective.  
They are encouraged to reflect on the fact that, as humans, they are not perfect sensory-cognitive-
judgment machines that decode social phenomena objectively without preconceptions. They 
instead must always remember that their perspective may distorted by the effects of unconscious 
bias.  
 
A plenary assignment that has become useful as a tool for understanding ontology and 
epistemology is the discussion of Santa Claus as a true physically existing entity and Santa Claus 
as a social construct in the collective minds of children: the two different ontological perspectives 
of the entity require two different epistemological strategies for acquiring two different types of 
knowledge. When asked to apply this perspective on the professional practice of intelligence, the 
students soon become aware of the importance of not confusing knowledge derived from 
naturalism (positivism, science) with the knowledge derived from interpretation (arts, humanities, 
hermeneutics) – and vice versa. This plenary assignment may sound like a simple parlour game, 
but simplicity often works wonders when explaining concepts that are not easily and readily 
accessible.  
 
Another fixed module, based upon an in-depth reflection combined with continuous distance-
learning over the three years of the programme is ‘Practical Intelligence Leadership’. This 
module introduces the students to a variety of concepts and issues related to leadership.  These 
include general theories of leadership, the difference between governance, management and 
leadership, and the various, often tacit, leadership aspects in the intelligence domain. These 
dimensions of leadership are not always specifically covered in the various intelligence literatures. 
It is therefore of particular interest to reflect upon for the professional’s role in managing 
collection, analysis and dissemination – and all the people involved in the different stages. 
 
Whereas the aforementioned modules comprise basic elements required in a professional 
perspective on intelligence (i.e., judicial, ethics, governance, and management, elements that were 
regarded as mandatory content in a professional program), it was necessary to look outside 
Norway for content that would fulfil the academic perspective in the programme. This was 
necessary as the NORDIS approach to intelligence in a professional higher education programme 
was not limited to intelligence being a component in the study of military power, but as an object 
of study in itself, and therefore was not part of the traditional programmes in the national defence 
colleges or the public universities in Norway.  In the process of searching for the right 
combination of scholarly approaches to studying intelligence, NORDIS chose the Goodman-
Omand perspective based on the Stafford Thomas typology as regards the academic content in 
higher education programmes in intelligence.
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 In compliance with the overarching purpose of the 
programme and the Goodman-Omand approach, with its four distinct perspectives on the 
intelligence enterprise, visiting professors from King’s College London and the University of 
Glasgow were asked to become contributors to teaching and research in the programme. 
 The four modules that they were asked to deliver are flexible and taught every other year, yielding 
the valuable effect of having two cohorts meeting each other in the classroom. It has been 
structured after different perspectives in which to view intelligence; history -, function -, structural 
- and decision makers’ perspective. 
 
Block 1 - The Historical Perspective 
The first two blocks of the course cover the ‘historical’ and the ‘functional’ perspectives of 
intelligence. The first block offers students on a broad survey of the rise of intelligence as the 
activity and institutions of states in the international system, roughly from 1500 to 1945. While 
the course does introduce the participants to key concepts such as historiography and key skills 
such as primary source analysis, the main goal is on provide students with the sense of context 
they will need to reflect on the historical background to their own careers and the agencies they 
work for, as well as that for the other three blocks of programme. In addition to the academic 
content, we also offer students a session on essay how to write an essay and how to read scholar 
articles and monographs. The second block on the ‘functional’ perspective focuses on intelligence 
as an activity though the whole intelligence cycle, from collection to analysis to dissemination, and 
its use and abuse as a product. In addition to studying how individuals, organizations and 
intelligence communities have collected and used intelligence, this block also includes the first of 
several in-depth discussions of the ethics of intelligence. 
 
Week one of the ‘historical perspective’ begins with two lectures that introduce the students to 
the historiographical debates in the history of intelligence as well as some of the key 
epistemological issues and intelligence studies concepts such as the ‘consumer-producer’ 
relationship. We survey the early modern period: students learn about the dynamics of early 
modern great-power politics, the rise of the permanent ambassador and professional diplomats, 
and the influence of espionage and diplomatic reporting in the reign of Philip II of Spain. The 
students, for example, debate the part played by intelligence in the defeat of the Spanish Armada 
in 1588. We also hold a more general discussion about what ‘lessons’ can be drawn intelligence 
history based on the work of scholars such as David Kahn, Ernest May and Philip Zelikow. The 
theme of intelligence and the psychology of command in war runs through the sessions we spend 
on the Napoleonic period. Here we contrast Carl von Clausewitz’s apparent skepticism about the 
value of intelligence for the commander with the evidence of the superb use Napoleon and his 
foes made of timely information at the strategic and operational levels. As we approach the 
twentieth century in the second half of week one, the teaching method shifts from lectures to 
small group work and presentations. Because the students have some background in the history 
of the twentieth century, particularly the two world wars, we can concentrate on particularly 
instructive episodes with great contemporary relevance such as the revelation of the Zimmermann 
Telegram in February 1917, British wartime propaganda efforts in the US and its impact on the 
US entry into the First World War.   
 
The section on the First World War, which begins the second week of the ‘History of Intelligence’ 
block, begins by considering the role of intelligence in shaping decision-making in 1914. This is 
still an area where considerable research needs to be done to build up a clear picture of the way 
intelligence reporting shaped perceptions among all of the major powers.  The background to 
this question is vital.  We begin with a lecture on the evolution of permanent peacetime 
intelligence gathering bureaucracies within the military staffs of the major European powers.  We 
emphasize the importance of the Prussian Great General Staff system to this evolution.   
 
We then consider the extent to which the emergence of intelligence as a central element in 
peacetime planning was accelerated by the dramatic impact of both railroads and the telegraph 
on nineteenth century warfare. The combined effect of this new technology was to transform the 
conditions of time and space. Railroads changed the speed and scale of mobilization and 
deployment for war. Information could be transmitted and orders could be communicated at 
something close to real time. Mobilization and concentration could take place much more quickly 
and on a much larger scale. But it could hope to be successful without painstaking planning and 
preparations. This only increased demand for detailed intelligence on an ever-greater range of 
issues. To meet this demand, the Prussian Staff created two sections responsibility for the 
collection and organization of information. Crucially, these sections were given responsibility not 
only for the acquisition and collation of intelligence, but also for its analysis. Staff officers were 
charged with the preparation of strategic appreciations based on the synthesis and analysis of all 
relevant information, including received intelligence. This was a major advance from the previous 
era, when raw intelligence on strategic and operational issues was nearly always analysed by 
political leaders and field commanders. Another important innovation was the gradual 
institutionalization of the military attaché. The role of attachés, (military observers accredited to 
foreign governments) was initially to report on strictly military issues in the state to which they 
were posted. Inevitably, however, the parameters of attaché reporting expanded to encompass 
political and economic issues as well. Once again, Prussia led the way in this trend. It appointed 
the first attachés in 1816, with other European powers gradually following suit over the next half 
century.  
 
Great importance is attached in this section to the key product of Prussian General Staff work: 
the ‘estimate of the situation’.  This was the forerunner of what is now known as a ‘net assessment’.  
Essentially, the Prussian staff system was a response to the changing nature of conflict and the 
need to manage effectively the ever-increasing volume of information relevant to waging war. Only 
permanent institutions charged specifically with the ongoing task of information gathering, 
analysis, and planning, in peacetime as well as during war, could cope with the challenges of 
strategy in the modern period. All of these were crucial innovations that gave the Prussian army 
important advantages during the wars of German unification between 1864 and 1871. After the 
tremendous victories achieved by German military power during this period, the Prussian system 
became a model for other continental European armies. 
 
The importance of these developments for the history of intelligence is difficult to overstate to 
our students. Before 1870, foreign intelligence had been an ad hoc affair among most of the larger 
powers. This is not to say that intelligence services had not existed. They had. But they lacked 
permanence. By the outbreak of the First World War, however, every major power possessed 
permanent organizations responsible for gathering intelligence and preparing assessments for 
decision makers. 
 
We stress that an important but often overlooked consequence of the influence of the Prussian 
model of staff organization is that the business of gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence 
came to be dominated by military officials. The result was a militarization of threat assessment 
that had important repercussions for international relations before the First World War.  This 
meant that intelligence bureaucracies provided decision makers with detailed pictures of the 
current and future balance of power.  But these estimates were not accompanied by similarly 
detailed political intelligence on the intentions of other actors.  The result, we emphasize to our 
students, was that assessments of capabilities tended to shape assessments of intentions in ways 
that fed into and reinforced a growing sense of the inevitability of war that was a crucial 
characteristic of both military and civilian perceptions and decision-making during the crisis of 
July 1914.  
 
This element of the block is very useful for encouraging students to reflect upon the specific 
characteristics of ‘military intelligence’ as it is practiced by military officials. Students are 
encouraged to reflect on the possibility that military officials are inclined to place greater emphasis 
on questions such as the target’s order of battle and less on what use the target actor might make 
of the capabilities they possess. We also encourage students to consider the argument that military 
officials are more inclined towards ‘worst-case’ assessments than their civilian counterparts. This 
lays the foundations for a theme to which we return frequently over the course of the module and 
the course in general.  
 
Another major theme of this section of the block is the question of whether the First World War 
was an ‘intelligence revolution’. There were a number of key dimensions to the transformative 
character of the war on intelligence practices. By 1918 all of the modern ‘collection disciplines’ 
were being used systematically to obtain intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of other 
actors.  With the advent of the aircraft and radio communications, war was now waged in the air 
as well as on the ground and at sea.  Imagery intelligence came into its own with the advent of the 
aircraft and aerial photography, which proved a vital source of information on the enemy order 
of battle at the operational and especially the tactical levels of war. Communication over the 
airwaves, meanwhile, led the evolution of increasingly large and sophisticated systems for the 
interception of radio signals. This was only a part of a wider transformation in the scale of 
communications intelligence.  As the size and complexity of land armies increased on a hitherto 
unimaginable scale, so did their human and technological systems for communication and for 
collecting intelligence. The students are asked to take a position on the judgment of John Ferris 
that ‘the modern age of intelligence began in 1914’.  
 
We then turn to the level of strategy and strategic assessment.  The sheer dimensions of the 
conflict transformed approaches to understanding national power. Armies numbering in the 
millions remained locked for more than four years in a struggle for national survival that affected 
every level of belligerent societies. In this new era of mass industrialized war, familiar factors such 
as demography, industrial power, and financial strength became more important than ever. 
Added to these considerations were new categories of power, such as access to raw materials or 
social and political cohesion.  We ask the students to reflect on these developments and consider 
the extent to which they have endured and even expanded since 1919.      
 
The next section of the historical block focuses on the inter-war period.  It departs from the 
observation that virtually all of the great powers, with the notable exception of the United States, 
entered the interwar period with much larger and better-organized intelligence and 
counterintelligence services than they had possessed before 1914.  A central theme of this section 
is the interrelationship between both internal and external threats to national security and the 
intelligence systems that were developed (albeit slowly) to counter these threats.  
 
The case of the USSR is uniquely important to the way this material is taught for two reasons.  
First, it in many ways embodied the inside/outside character of security threats in an aged of 
highly-charged ideological struggle.  Second, intelligence played a central role in the functioning 
of the Soviet state from its very beginnings. The Cheka, founded in the dire circumstances of 
Russian Revolution and civil war, quickly evolved into the central organ for both internal security 
and foreign intelligence collection. It acquired, and retained, more extensive powers than any 
other secret service until the rise of the Nazi regime. The result was that there was no independent 
Soviet foreign intelligence service. The other agency responsible for exclusively foreign collection 
was the intelligence department of the Red Army. The result was that the search for foreign 
intelligence was integrated into the vast Soviet state security and intelligence machinery that, by 
the mid-1930s, controlled the sprawling empire of slave labor established by Stalin’s regime. 
Students are encouraged to try to imagine the effective functioning of the Soviet State, certainly 
the Stalinist State, without intelligence.   
 
In this way, our teaching seeks to illuminate the central role intelligence agencies have played in 
the oppression of political freedom.  This sets up the subsequent discussion of the role of the 
various security and intelligence services in the consolidation and expansion of Hitler’s National 
Socialist regime after 1933. Links are also made to the role of secret police agencies in other 
national and historical contexts, from Rome through to the French Revolution and Napoleonic 
regimes.  This, in turn, lays the groundwork for subsequent teaching of both intelligence functions 
and intelligence ethics.  
 
There is also a full-day section on the role of intelligence in the British and French policies of 
appeasement during the mid to late 1930s.  This section allows us to explore the concepts such 
as bureaucratic rivalry and the politicization of intelligence more generally. We consider the role 
of these phenomena in the systematic over-estimation of the performance of the Nazi economy 
as well as the growth of German land and air power from 1936 through to the summer of 1939 
as well as the role these flawed assessments in underpinning the policy of making concessions to 
Germany. This material is also useful as a case study of the formidable challenges in the way of 
assessing economic power and the related question of industrial production.  Assessments of 
German aircraft production are an excellent example of these challenges.  This sets up 
subsequent teaching on the subject of economic intelligence in general and estimates of Soviet 
economic power in the 1970s and 1980s.   
  
Another important theme in this section of the block is the evolution of machinery for economic 
intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing and joint assessment across various departments 
and services within national contexts. Both the French and the British security establishments 
created organs for the assessment of economic intelligence.  In both cases these organs were 
situated initially within the machinery of strategic policy-making.  In both cases they drew 
overwhelmingly on open sources.  This discussion provides an excellent basis for discussing the 
long history of systematic exploitation of open source information to support decision-making 
and strategic planning. Just as important is the material we use to teach the students about the 
creation of mechanisms of ‘joint assessment’ in France and especially in Great Britain before the 
Second World War.  This helps establish the foundations for a more detailed and sophisticated 
understanding of the evolution of joint assessment as a practice.  
 
Given the great importance of the Second World War to the foundation of Norway’s intelligence 
community, we spend two days on that period and its legacy, with an emphasis on ‘warning 
failures’ and surprise attacks. We compare the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 
June 1941 to that of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December of that year. For 
the former case, the students analyze a set of UK Joint Intelligence Committee reports from May-
June 1941 to highlight parallels between the British and Soviet errors in assessing German 
intentions. For Pearl Harbor, we have organized a team exercise in which the students play the 
role of US naval intelligence officers on 6 December 1941 in the context of Roberta Wohlstetter’s 
famous thesis about the volume of intelligence (or noise) obscuring evidence (signals) of Tokyo’s 
intentions: each team analyzes a set of Magic intercepts (correspondence from the Japanese 
embassy in Washington to Tokyo etc.) for evidence of the timing and target of a Japanese attack. 
Again, we try to integrate some skills and methods teaching into each historical case study. For 
example, the students are asked to prepare a group presentation on the effectiveness of British 
and Norwegian intelligence before the event of 9 April 1940, the German invasions of Denmark 
and Norway, in the form of an essay plan. The students are also offered an introduction to the 
use of counterfactual analysis to assess the impact of Ultra on the duration and outcome of the 
Second World War. We also examine the success of Allied strategic deception in the 
Mediterranean and in Normandy campaigns in the context of a debate about causation: how do 
historians know whether a deception campaign has worked and what does that tell us about how 
to engineer an effective strategic deception.  
 
Throughout both weeks of Block 1 students work in groups to prepare collaborative 
presentations on topics given to them at the beginning of the block.  They are encouraged to 
approach these presentations as academic exercises, rather than the kind of briefings they are 
accustomed to give to policy consumers in their day jobs.   This means they must engage with the 
relevant academic literature and take a position on any historiographical or theoretical debates 
arising from this literature.  The instructors provide assistance where appropriate. But the 
assumption is that students work in groups independently of close supervision from instructors.   
 
Block 2 - The Functional Perspective 
The second block, ‘the functional perspective’, builds on the history module by placing more 
emphasis on themes and debates in intelligence studies. The emphasis is on how intelligence is 
used in international and domestic contexts. We challenge the students, all practitioners, to reflect 
on their role and experiences as intelligence professionals working at the national and 
international levels. The first week is organized around five themes: 1) intelligence, crises and 
deterrence 2) the pathologies of the consumer producer relationship 3) politicization and 
intelligence failure 4) intelligence Ethics and 5) surveillance and the state. 
 
To explore the role of intelligence in international crises, we introduce students to examine how 
intelligence contributed to the origins, course and outcome of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and 
to the debate about whether the Able Archer exercise of 1983 brought NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact countries to the brink of war. The Cuban crisis is now extremely well documented and it 
provides the students with a clear instance of how ideologically motivated behaviour made it 
difficult for the Cold-War adversaries to predict each other’s intentions and actions. For Able 
Archer, the students read contradictory scholarly articles about the episode as well as primary 
material to conclude for themselves whether faulty intelligence processes combined with 
President Reagan’s aggressive rhetoric and the NATO military buildup led to the Soviet bloc 
leadership to inflate the threat of a surprise attack. The danger that intelligence might serve to 
inflate threats and thereby distort national security policy is carried over into a session about the 
role of intelligence in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The events leading to the Iraq war 
provides a contested case to provoke discussion of the themes of this part of the teaching 
programme, including the consumer producer relationship and politicization. Did policy makers 
in Washington and London extract from their intelligence advisors the inflated threat analyses 
they needed publicly justify a policy of war? Or can the erroneous conclusions reached by US 
and UK intelligence about Iraqi WMD be explained by other causes such as poor sources, faulty 
analysis or a misplaced desire to please political leaders? More generally, we encourage the 
students to consider whether the pathologies of consumer producer relationships discernable 
during the Cuban crisis, the Able Archer episode and the run up to the 2003 Iraq war are 
inevitable? Or can they be prevented with organizational/methodological solutions such as devil’s 
advocates, red teams or reforms to the intelligence cycle?  
 
Ethics is a core topic that runs through the entire bachelor’s programme, and in this module the 
students are taught the various ways of framing the ethical dilemmas raised by intelligence work. 
To teach ethics, we have found that assigning a combination of readings from the purely 
philosophical alongside those written by former practitioners helps students to bridge their own 
experiences (as well as Norwegian legal and ethical frameworks and practices) with the more 
esoteric aspects of the subject. We also ask the students to debate the ethics of various scenarios 
based on real cases from intelligence history as well as to devise their own fictional ethical 
conundrums to be presented to the class for a debate. Politics and ideology are integral to the 
issue of domestic surveillance and legal-moral limits of state power. East German society and the 
intrusiveness of the STASI into the private lives of its citizens provides an extreme case to study 
how the surveillance of dissent can if unchecked by moral and political limits can expand to 
consume the resources of a state and to destroy its legitimacy. More generally, we discuss the ways 
in which the growth of the internet and social media has both changed the way people think about 
privacy in liberal societies and the legal-ethical implications of bulk collection, the storage of 
internet searches and other meta data to fight crime and terrorism. This session concludes with 
a screening of the classic 1974 film The Conversation, in which Gene Hackman plays the role of 
a private surveillance specialist.  
 
The second week block is divided into four themes: i) Assessing intentions b) Warning failures 
c) Forecasting and horizon scanning iv) Intelligence reform.  Each theme is approached through 
the medium of case studies, many of which draw on material related, but not identical to, the 
earlier historical block.  
 The first section focuses on ‘Assessing the Nazi Threat’.  It focuses on the performance of French 
and British intelligence in providing a clear and accurate picture of the intentions of the Nazi 
regime.  British and French appeasement also provides a good introduction to the specific 
problem of evaluating the intentions of political leaders.  The misconception at the heart of the 
policy of appeasement, at least on the British side, was Neville Chamberlain’s conviction that it 
was possible to negotiate an agreement with Adolf Hitler that would prove relatively durable.  The 
French were much more skeptical of the possibility of such an arrangement as a source of peace 
even in the short-term.  This provides interesting material for a comparative analysis of French 
and British assessments of Nazi intentions.  Because there is a wealth of documentary material 
available on French and British estimates of the political intentions of the Nazi leadership, this 
section of the block provides an excellent context for breaking up into smaller groups to consider 
different aspects of the problem.  The relationship between perceptions of capabilities and 
intentions is central to this topic. Indeed it is a central theme of the entire degree course.  To 
what extent does the picture constructed of a given target’s capabilities shape the way that target’s 
intentions are interpreted? And vice-versa?  
 
We then revisit the question of the distinctive characteristics of military and civilian intelligence 
work.  Student are asked to discuss and debate the question ‘Military versus Civilian Agency 
Intelligence Estimates’ with a specific focus on intentions.  Students are encouraged to deploy 
reading they have done in the historical block to inform their perspectives on this question.  This 
is an excellent example of research-led teaching that has the capacity to enhance the perspectives 
of both students and their instructors.  The complex and dynamic relationship between 
assessments of intentions and capabilities is a badly neglected area in the existing scholarship on 
intelligence and international security. Debating and discussing this relationship with career 
intelligence professionals is a fantastic opportunity for to obtain new perspectives on this complex 
issue. 
 
The next section of the functions block explores the problem of intelligence failure from various 
angles.  It begins with a focused debate based on the challenging arguments pure forward in Mark 
Lowenthal’s seminal essay ‘The Burdensome Concept of Failure’.  The case study we use is the 
successful attacks on the US of 11 September 2001.  The key primary source is The 9/11 Report, 
which students read before the week begins. We first debate whether the 9/11 attacks can be 
considered a failure at all, and, if so, what kind of failure. We use this primary material to assess 
Amy Zegart’s thesis that the US intelligence and security agencies were guilty of ‘adaptation 
failure’.  Students are asked to give their own opinions on the explanatory power of Zegart’s 
adaptation failure concept and to reflect on its wider ramifications in the practice of intelligence.   
 
The next section considers the challenges inherent in ‘Horizon Scanning’. The collapse of the 
USSR is used as the key case study here.  The students do background reading on the various 
assessments that were made of the performance of the Soviet economy and evidence of societal 
cohesion.
1
  We devote an hour to analyzing and debating the famous memorandum by Herbert 
Meyer of November 1983 memorandum assessing the state of the USSR.  Meyer, special assistant 
to DCI William Casey and vice-chair of the US National Intelligence Council, judged that ‘the 
free world has out-distanced the Soviet Union economically, crushed it ideologically, and held it 
off politically’ and concluded that the US should ‘begin planning for a post-Soviet World’.  
Students are asked to set this memorandum within the wider context of assessments of Soviet 
power and consider two key sets of questions.  First, what was the hard evidence Meyer used to 
support his conclusion?  Why was his assessment a relative outlier among similar attempts to 
estimate Soviet power? Was he right for the wrong reasons (as is sometimes the case)? Second, 
how were Meyer’s judgments and predictions received by policy consumers? What impact did 
they have on the perceptions and decisions of key American decision-makers at this critical 
juncture? This is an excellent case study to explore the formidable difficulties facing all attempts 
to formulate, interpret and use long-range strategic estimates.  
 
We then move on to consider the politics of intelligence reform.  Our focus for this topic is the 
US reaction to the events of 11 September 2001. The restructuring of the US intelligence 
community, along with fundamental changes in practices of information sharing across that 
community, have created a wide array of new challenges and vulnerabilities. These are considered 
in detail in this section of the block. After a lecture on the politics of intelligence reform in 
historical perspective, the students discuss and debate the origins, character and effectiveness of 
intelligence reform in the US since 2001. This discussion is based on reading some of the 
literature on this question from Richard Betts, Amy Zegart and Peter Jackson.  
 
                                                        
1 We use the ‘Princeton Collection’ of declassified documents here: 
http://www.foia.ucia.gov/princeton_collection.htm.  
The final teaching section of this block focuses on ‘The Myriad Forms of Intelligence 
Cooperation’.  Central considerations for this topic are the motivations leading national agencies 
to cooperate with one another. Is co-operation driven overwhelmingly by national interest? Or 
does ideology play an important role? We look at the variety of co-operative relationships since 
the First World War as well as the specific contexts in which these relationships have emerged.  
We then try to develop a typology for different levels of intimacy in intelligence co-operation 
relationships: from the sporadic sharing of information to systematic arrangements to coordinate 
the collection and analysis of intelligence.  This section of the block ends with group presentations.  
 
Block 3 - The Structural Perspective 
The last two blocks of the course cover the ‘structural perspective of intelligence’ and the ‘decision 
maker’s perspective of intelligence’.  The first of these is designed to focus on issues related to 
the institutions of intelligence within different national approaches.  By ‘institutions’ and 
‘structures’ we focused on two broad aspects: first, how countries organise their intelligence 
structures; and second, a consideration of the different means by which intelligence work is 
regulated in these countries.  The intention was to deliver a holistic sense of the manner in which 
intelligence functions in accordance with a variety of issues, including legal, ethical and public 
considerations.  
In order to achieve these objectives, the first week of the ‘structural’ block began by focusing on 
the matter of intelligence culture. We then proceeded to examine the organisation, history and 
historiography, and various key issues associated with the US, the Soviet/Russian, the Chinese, 
and the British intelligence communities. Each day in the second week dealt with a different 
theme or issue related to the structure of intelligence.  The days invariably began with a lecture, 
punctuated by questions and discussion, and would be followed by an interactive case-study, 
designed to build upon the content of the lecture, the students’ reading around the subject and 
any practical experience they might have. Given than this bloc occurred some months after the 
previous one, we also discussed the requirements and conventions of academic research and 
writing (which remained rather far-removed from the day-to-day work of the students) to 
complement the critical study of our subject matter. 
The rationale behind beginning the block with a consideration of intelligence culture was twofold. 
First, we felt it necessary to equip students with the tools to consider the intelligence structures 
and communities they would soon study with an eye to their distinct institutional, historical, and 
cultural locations. Considering the matter of intelligence culture broadly – the culture of 
intelligence communities, and the role of intelligence or ‘the spy’ in popular culture – helped the 
students, most of whom had not studied intelligence as an academic subject previously, to place 
the communities they would subsequently study in the context of the broader bureaucracies of 
their respective states, rather than as agencies completely isolated from them.  
We also judged it was important to give the students the opportunity to dwell on their own 
understanding and experiences of intelligence in the Norwegian context. The class was varied in 
terms of institution, experience, discipline. It had become clear in the discussions concerning the 
overall rationale of the course that it provided a rare opportunity for a sustained, scholarly, frank 
and challenging discussion of what intelligence meant in Norway, how different agencies 
understood and performed their missions, and how they had identified and learned different 
lessons from the various historical and contemporary threats to Norwegian security. As with many 
professionals, their day to day focus did not provide them with the opportunity to consider their 
role, that of their organisation, or of their community in a broader perspective. The discussion of 
culture was, essentially, designed to foster engagement and a degree of reflection on the question 
of ‘what is Norwegian culture of intelligence and culture of secrecy?’  
Studying these trends required tracing the evolution of intelligence literature and historiography 
across various countries and communities. The English historiography on intelligence is weighted 
heavily towards the ‘English-speaking alliance’ – and even within that to the US and UK 
communities, and, regarding them, to strategic intelligence and covert operations. Other 
communities, including those that formed the topics for subsequent days, are under-studied in 
comparison, both from historical and a theoretical perspectives.  This preceded a discussion on 
what the implications of this historiographical imbalance are for the study of intelligence. We 
placed particular emphasis on the implications for our assessment of intelligence performance 
and lessons-learned analyses, which, owing to the historiographical and case study bias, must be 
considered with care. Students were encouraged to question whether or not lessons were 
transferable across intelligence communities and cultures, or whether intelligence studies remains 
somewhat parochial, entrenched (mostly) in Western experience and culture. In short, beginning 
the block with a discussion of intelligence culture was designed to foster critical engagement with 
the subsequent subject matter. 
We then moved on to study specific communities.  The objective for each day was to allow the 
students to consider the evolution of the community in question, the nature of the historiography 
and the academic source material, and the manner the community is evolving and adapting to 
contemporary threats. The first community we studied was the US community, the second was 
the Russian, the third was the Chinese, the British intelligence community was the fourth.  
The US intelligence community is the least problematic to study. There is an abundance of 
research material, and the students were generally familiar with a number of the organisations, 
issues, and controversies. There is ample scope to use the US as a vehicle for exploring a wide 
number of themes. Our approach was historical and thematic. We began with the ‘pre-history’ 
of US intelligence, before moving on to the creation of the ‘national security state’, the Cold War 
and the adaptation to the counter terrorism mission of the twenty-first century. Each period was 
matched with a discussion of a particular, pertinent issue related to intelligence structures and the 
impact of structure on performance. For example, we examined the debates over the role of 
structure in the Pearl Harbor failure through the perspective of a Central Intelligence Group 
report, and the suitability of current structures for countering international terrorism through the 
discussions of the 9/11 failure, particularly the 9/11 Commission report, its recommendations 
and their implementation. The learning objectives focused not only upon developing an 
understanding of the structures of the US intelligence community, but also how the structure 
creates specific issues and debates concerning its performance.  
The aim of the session on Russian and Soviet intelligence was, similarly, to facilitate the students’ 
understanding of the methodological challenge of the subject, the community’s history and 
design, and consistent themes that relate to the community. We began with a consideration of 
the historiography, and a discussion of the challenges of dealing with a literature that is often 
written form the outside-in, in collaboration with defectors and intelligence agencies, or with the 
aid of the organisations being studied. This lay the foundation of our study of the evolution, 
structures, and operations of the Russian community during the Cold War and beyond. We 
matched the eras of Russian intelligence with a consideration of the impact of several issues on 
the nature of the machinery: dictatorship and the legacy of dictatorship; the internal policing 
function; the distinct and particular requirements for active measures; and the adaptation of the 
structures to the age of the internet and the Putin era. The issues at the heart of the discussion 
included questioning the role of the intelligence machinery in the Soviet and the Russian state? 
Studying Chinese intelligence organisations and operations is extremely difficult. Therefore, we 
considered it essential to underline the limited number and quality of sources on the subject at 
the outset. We began the section with a consideration of the academic perspectives on the models 
of Chinese intelligence, their origins, and their merits. We then examined the evolution of 
Chinese intelligence, beginning with the Civil War. We paid particular attention to the 
development of PLA structures, and the case studies of Chinese espionage that have been 
uncovered and publicized in the West. As with the previous cases, the examination of the history, 
structure and activities of the community was linked with a discussion of particular issues in 
intelligence studies, and in the relationship between Chinese intelligence and the broader Chinese 
state. The key issues included the role of economic intelligence in state development, and the 
evolving role of online espionage and covert actions in Chinese operations. Our aim was to, first, 
encourage the students to consider the meaning of intelligence in a Chinese context, and, second, 
debate current, significant issues, such as developing norms for offensive actions in the online 
environment.  
The second week of the ‘Structural’ block continued the content from week one by starting with 
a day-long session on the UK.  This included a consideration not only of how intelligence is 
approached organisationally in the UK, but more specifically a look at the guiding principles 
behind it. We examined two aspects in particular: the importance of consensus at a strategic level, 
particularly the manner in which the intelligence and policy communities interact; and the role 
that committees play at all level of the process.  In the afternoon, a case-study explored the 
changing definitions of ‘National Security’ in the UK using a variety of official documents.  The 
key point to emerge was how the scope and responsibilities for the intelligence community were 
changing as a result. 
Day two considered the evolution of intelligence in countries that transition to democracy: there 
is a significant and established literature on Security Sector Reform, but this often ignores the role 
of intelligence in the development of states and stable governments.  The session considered 
samples of this literature and used a variety of case-studies to explore how the process had worked 
in practice.  One of the underlying themes was a consideration of the different approaches to 
intelligence in democracies compared to authoritarian states: for instance, if both are concerned 
with the preservation of the state (regardless of our view of that state), is it really the means by 
which control or monitoring of ‘threats’ varies that distinguishes them?  This theme included an 
interactive session where the class was split into groups, with each selecting their own country for 
which to research and prepare their findings.   
The third day focused on intelligence liaison. Students were introduced to a variety of historical 
and contemporary examples, which were then used to explore more generic issues related to 
what is often one of the most sensitive aspects of intelligence work. Some of the attention was on 
perhaps the best-known example of intelligence liaison, the long-standing UK-US relationship, 
but the (also very well-established) Anglo-Norwegian relationship was explored too.  The lecture 
included not just international bilateral relationships, but also some content on multilateral as well 
as intra-national relationships.  The session culminated with an examination of reasons why states 
might want to interact, some of the benefits that liaison brings, but also some of the dangers 
inherent to it.  In the afternoon, a long group exercise dwelt on some of these issues by looking 
at a fictitious scenario in which British code-breakers had intercepted a message whose contents 
could have entailed Britain being dragged into an unpopular conflict, but in attempting to prevent 
involvement it would have meant divulging the message.  This exercise worked particularly well 
and group members had various animated conversations on the balance between source 
protection and acting on important intelligence when liaison relationships are at stake. 
The final day-long session considered issues relevant to the preceding content: the question of 
intelligence ethics, accountability and oversight.  The lecture considered this in a variety of ways, 
from philosophical and political approaches, to the different ways in which oversight is exacted: 
from public, legal, and judicial, through to trial by the media.  The group exercise focused on a 
hypothetical scenario in which class members pretended to be a journalist who had stumbled 
upon a secret discussion between a terrorist group and government officials, and questioned their 
ethical stance and decision-making. 
The block was assessed via two group presentations, one for each week.  In the second week 
students were set the question ‘Does Intelligence Need to be Secret?’. In groups of 4 they were 
given 4 days in which to prepare a 10-minute presentation, for which they were assessed.  The 
question was deliberately vague and designed not to have a specific answer.  It was a useful 
exercise and it was interesting to observe how the different groups, comprising a mixture of 
military and civilian students, produced varied responses. 
In addition to the group work, each student was required to produce a 4,000-word essay, 
answering 1 question from a list that we had set them.  These questions were designed to test not 
only their grasp of the academic literature, but to try and challenge them to relate their own 
experiences to what they had read and listened to in class.  By and large this was achieved and 
the essays were of a generally good standard. 
 
Block 4 - The Decision Makers' Perspective 
 
The fourth and final block was entitled the ‘Decision Makers’ Perspective of Intelligence’.  Our 
key objectives for this block included designing a series of experiences that ensured our students, 
mostly practitioners of intelligence, developed an understanding of the relationship between their 
function and the broader political community they support, as well as empathy for their 
customers. Our learning outcomes included building upon subject the students had discussed 
previously and, first, developing an understanding of cognitive issues that impede on decision 
makers’ appreciation and use of intelligence agencies; and, second, developing an appreciation 
of how the climate of secrecy is evolving and how this must factor into intelligence activities and 
considerations, particularly with regard considerations of exposure and ethics. We selected 
several themes that were relevant to ongoing intelligence-policy challenges. At a basic level the 
point of this block was straightforward: to discuss and debate the manner in which intelligence 
interacts with decision makers’; yet contained within this was a number of competing and 
complicated issues.   
One of the central focuses on the first day was the question of proximity: how close should the 
two communities be and what level of interaction should take place?  Various answers to this 
question were discussed and different national approaches were debated.  In the afternoon 
students were split into three groups for an exercise that attempted to probe these issues in a 
more practical sense.  Each group had the same questions to address (such as ‘Should intelligence 
ever be withheld from policy-makers in your country, and if so, in what circumstances?) but the 
remit for each was markedly different.  One group was a large Western government with an 
unlimited money, influence and concerns; the second group was a smaller mid-size power with 
global concerns but limited reach; while the third was a small Southern Hemisphere state with no 
influence and only regional concerns.  The exercise sought to identify how each group thought 
about intelligence, whether money and influence were driving factors in the manner in which they 
approach a national system and co-ordinated the producer/consumer aspects, or whether a 
utopian vision of how the two communities should interact was key. 
The rest of the week built upon this content to focus on a series of related issues, each of which 
had the intelligence/policy relationship at its core.  The second day considered what happens 
when the relationship breaks down and intelligence fails.  It included detail on different examples 
of surprise attack, of warning failure and of intelligence setbacks.  Different typologies were 
presented, as were different ways of thinking about some of the issues.  A number of less cited 
examples were drawn upon, including the erroneous British assessments prior to the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and this was contrasted to the successes encountered when 
predicting what would happen with regard to the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961.  An exercise 
considered issues related to predicting crises with the class split into three groups (one were 
decision-makers; one intelligence analysts; the last academics or external commentators) with 
each given set information and responsibilities to see how each group reacted to a fictitious 
scenario. 
The third day extended the content of the previous day by considering high-risk low-probability 
events.  The class participated in a detailed examination of threat prediction, of the use of 
indicators and warnings, as well as the issues surrounding the identification of intentions and 
capabilities.  A detailed case-study on nuclear proliferation and the A Q Khan network was 
provided to illustrate these points. The day culminated with an exercise looking at the early days 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the issue of balancing risk with intelligence collection: in order to 
discover what the Soviets were up to on Cuba, would they authorise a politically-risky overflight? 
The final day of the first week of Block 4 looked at intelligence and terrorism.  It began with an 
examination of the lessons derived from Britain’s experiences, starting with fighting colonial 
counter-insurgency, through the intelligence war in Northern Ireland, to more recent examples 
of Islamist terrorism.  The common aspects were considered, as were the differences.  
Like previous Blocks, students were provided with the question for their oral exam on the 
Monday morning, and four days later they presented their answers.  The question they were set 
was: If we accept Betts’ hypothesis that ‘intelligence failures are inevitable’, how should 
policymakers and the intelligence community approach the problem of surprise? Unsurprisingly 
a number of the presentations dealt with the Norwegian experience of Anders Breivik.  These 
were interesting and highlighted the value of the diverse student body and the benefits of getting 
individuals from different organisations to interact and produce an agreed report.  
The second week of the fourth block began with an examination of deception. We decided to 
include deception to allow the class to consider the challenges that recent events, particularly in 
Crimea and Ukraine, pose for consumers. Consumers are increasingly pressured by the pace of 
events to make decisions rapidly and decisively, but in fraught and complex information 
environments, often fueled by sustained disinformation campaigns. Mutual understanding on the 
part of intelligence officers and decision-makers of their respective limits and capabilities is, 
therefore, increasingly significant. The study concerned history, theory and practice, detection, 
and communication of ambiguity and uncertainty. We focused on two particular issues 
concerning deception, intelligence and the consumer. First, the impact of deception on the 
analytical process, and how efforts to uncover deception in the information can impact upon the 
generation of a useful product. Second, how deception is not necessarily an external 
phenomenon, and how intelligence officers and consumers must be equally aware of the danger 
of self-deception.  
The second session focused on the growing importance of the public as a consumer of 
intelligence products. Our discussion on the matter built upon our deliberations from the 
previous day on the impact of information technology on intelligence activities, in particular the 
internet as a vector for exposure, and an eroding force on the secrecy that intelligence agencies 
could previously count upon. We placed this development in a broader context that included the 
fallout from the Iraq war, the general move toward openness and accountability in the West, and 
the requirement that modern counterterrorism has placed on intelligence agencies to be nearer 
the people. These developments form part of the evolution, that Peter Hennessy has narrated, 
from the ‘secret state’ of the Cold War to the ‘protective state’, where intelligence officers and 
security policy must account for the public’s perceptions and expectations to a far greater degree.  
The third session focused on intelligence agencies as ‘service providers’, as organisations that 
provide a wide range of functions that decision makers can utilise in particular circumstances. 
This required considering of intelligence agencies as broader political actors, and, therefore, a 
consideration of issues including the dangers of politicisation, and ethics. The students 
considered various forms of service, ranging from covert actions, to propaganda, to delicate 
negotiations with various state and non-state actors. The students examined historic and 
contemporary examples, ranging from the covert actions of the Kennedy administration, to the 
US Afghanistan operations in the 1980s, to the management of the back-channel between British 
intelligence and PIRA. The objectives included underlining the broader role of intelligence 
agencies in statecraft. And for the students to consider the opportunities and risks for intelligence 
agencies and policymakers when agencies are tasked with providing such services. 
The fourth session considered intelligence, leaders and crises. The session was designed as a 
point of culmination, where each of the issues that had been discussed over the previous sessions 
and over previous blocs could be brought to bear in an analysis of how intelligence agencies and 
consumers interact in crises, what their mutual requirements are, and common pathologies that 
can undermine the relationship when it needs to be most functional. We examined historical and 
contemporary case studies, including state-focused crises and crises generated by non-state actors, 
and examined how policy-makers’ requirements would contrast with intelligence agencies’ ability 
to deliver what was demanded. The class concluded with a simulation designed to challenge the 
students to outline, consider, and develop the Norwegian model for crisis management for 
improved producer-consumer cooperation.   
 
Reflections 
 
While new cohorts are admitted to the programme in 2015 and 2016, the first cohort of students 
(2014-2017) are currently writing their bachelor's theses. In supervising the students it is evident 
that the programme has indeed had the desired effect: from the point of entering into the 
programme, up until writing their bachelors theses, the students have acquired a sound academic 
approach to studying the intelligence profession and engaging in the literature in the field, and 
– as tentatively seen from their supervisors' point of view – at a level that may even be somewhat 
more advanced than the requirements for the bachelor’s level.  
 
From an overarching perspective, the combined profession-academia programme has been 
successful in many ways: it attracts students from all parts of the national intelligence community. 
Although originally intended for professionals that did not have a formal degree, the programme 
has nevertheless started to attract applicants whom have already completed a bachelor’s degree 
prior to entering the programme, either from the professional defence colleges and/or from a 
civilian institution. Some students even have a master’s degree. As a result a proportional quota 
has now been imposed, ensuring that both students with and without a formal degree are allowed 
to enter the programme. What is important is that both student populations have had the 
opportunity to view the intelligence profession per se from an academic perspective.   
Furthermore, in both populations the students report that the programme has given them an 
opportunity to view their professional practice through the lens of academia and thus become 
even more aware of the value of profession-as-academe, as well as understanding the various 
knowledge-foundations of their own professional practice. It seems that this valuable knowledge 
is what motivates the students, and not necessarily the academic degree in itself.  
 
What is most striking in the classroom, besides the “mature” age of many of the students and the 
fact that so far there have been very few women, is their eagerness, their interest, and the 
fascinating, and often unexpected, discussions that arise. The School is conscious about creating 
an environment where these discussions can thrive; ranging from bespoke security considerations 
that allow them to talk “freely” in specific contexts, to purposely admitting a diverse set of students, 
from different operational backgrounds – be that from defence, police, or the justice department 
– as well as with different levels of understanding of the intelligence process. The instructors also 
encourage, and sometimes even provoke, discussion and allow it to develop on its own without 
remaining wedded in a rigid sense to the specific details of the seminar or lecture. 
 
The structure of having it run for 2 weeks twice per year was initially due to work and potentially 
deployment considerations, but it has become clear that another benefit is that the students have 
time to reflect on what they have learned, and compare, question, and bring this knowledge into 
their everyday work.  
 
The rationale for establishing this new experience-based programme in intelligence studies was 
built on the original idea that also paved the way for the establishment of NORDIS: The 
combination of professional studies and high academic standards. Although the language studies 
at NORDIS have for decades been built on the combination of, one the one hand teaching the 
students specific language-skills and specific region-knowledge relevant to carrying out various 
assignments in the intelligence community, and on the other hand securing the training with the 
high academic standards required for National accreditation, this had not always been the case 
with the broader aspect of intelligence as a profession.  Looking at the NORDIS traditions, one 
could say that it may possibly have been the language-section of NORDIS, with its emphasis on 
the combination of academia and the training of language skills - as well as the strategic 
recruitment of instructors with an academic degree in the professional training programmes - that 
inspired also the professional-training section to base the training programmes on an 
epistemologically sound foundation and made it possible to merge professional training and high 
academic standards into what is now known as an academic programme based both on the 
professional knowledge that comes from experience and the research-informed knowledge that 
comes from the rigorous standards of academia. 
 
In designing this programme we contended with many opposing, and sometimes 
contradictory forces. For example, on the one hand there is the profession’s need for 
speedy training, and on the other the reflective nature of academia. But, looking at the 
process in retrospect, it is not an understatement to say that the enterprise of 
transforming NORDIS into an accredited university college and establishing the new 
bachelors programme for professional students was both visionary and bold.  The process, 
carried out in the spirit of the Norwegian Intelligence Service and of NORDIS, resulted in an 
academically robust professional higher education programme that now attracts students from a 
variety of services within the intelligence community. 
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